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Abstract
We study the class of protocols for weak quantum coin flipping intro-
duced by Spekkens and Rudolph (quant-ph/0202118). We show that, for
any protocol in this class, one party can win the coin flip with probability
at least 1/
√
2.
1 Introduction
Coin flipping is a cryptographic primitive in which two parties (Alice and Bob)
together generate a random bit so that the value of the random bit cannot be
controlled by any one party. If both parties are honest, the random bit must be
0 with probability 1/2 and 1 with probability 1/2. If one party is honest but
the other is not, the honest party is still guaranteed that the cheater cannot
control the outcome.
There are two variants of this requirement. In strong coin flipping, we require
that, no matter what a dishonest Alice (dishonest Bob) does, the probability
of the result being a is at most PA (at most PB), for each of the two possible
outcomes a ∈ {0, 1}. In weak coin flipping, we know in advance that one outcome
(say, 0) benefits Alice and the other outcome (say, 1) benefits Bob. Therefore,
we only require that dishonest Alice cannot make result 0 with probability more
than PA and dishonest Bob cannot make the result 1 with probability more than
PB.
Coin flipping is possible classically with complexity assumptions such as the
existence of one-way functions [3]. In an information-theoretic setting (parties
with unlimited computational power), in any classical protocol there is a party
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which can set the outcome to 0 with certainty and 1 with certainty. Thus,
neither of the two variants is possible classically information-theoretically.
In the quantum model, strong coin flipping has been studied by [8, 9, 1, 2,
10, 7, 6]. The best protocol [2, 10] can achieve any combination of PA and PB
such that 0 ≤ PA, 0 ≤ PB, PA + PB = 12 . In particular, if we want to have the
same security guarantees for both parties, we can achieve PA = PB =
3
4
. The
best known lower bound is that any protocol for strong coin flipping must have
PAPB ≥ 12 [6]. If we want to have the same security guarantees for both parties,
this gives PA = PB =
1√
2
. This is quite close to what is achieved by [2, 10].
Less is known about weak coin flipping. The lower bound of [6] does not
apply to weak coin flipping. Thus, we might still have a protocol for weak coin
flipping with PA =
1
2
+ ǫ and PB =
1
2
+ ǫ for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. (An
“exact” protocol with ǫ = 0 is impossible because the impossibility proof for
exact protocols from [9] applies to weak coin flipping. Also, we know that if
ǫ > 0 is achievable, at least Ω(log log 1ǫ ) rounds are needed [2].)
Weak coin flipping has been studied by [4, 11]. The first protocol [4] achieved
PA = PB ≈ 0.327.... [11] described a general class of protocols and showed that
this class achieves any combination of PA, PB such that 0 < PA ≤ 1, 0 < PB ≤ 1
and PAPB =
1
2
. (The protocol achieving PAPB =
1
2
was also independently
discovered by the author of this note.) [11] conjectured that this is the best
possible for this class of protocols. In this note, we prove this conjecture.
2 A class of protocols
Rudolph and Spekkens [11] considered the following class of protocols for weak
coin flipping:
1. Alice prepares a pair of systems in a state |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB and sends the
system B to Bob.
2. Bob performs the POVM measurement {E0, E1} on HB, sends a classical
bit b with the outcome of the measurement to Alice.
3. If b = 0, Bob sends the system B back to Alice. If b = 1, Alice sends the
system A to Bob. The party that receives the system then checks whether
the joint state of A and B is |ψb〉 = I⊗
√
Eb|ψ〉√
〈ψ|I⊗Eb|ψ〉
by measuring an observ-
able consisting of |ψb〉 and its orthogonal complement. The possibilities
are
(a) b = 0, Alice finds |ψ0〉. Bob wins.
(b) b = 0, Alice does not find |ψ0〉. Alice has caught Bob cheating.
(c) b = 1, Bob finds |ψ1〉. Alice wins.
(d) b = 1, Bob does not find |ψ1〉. Bob has caught Alice cheating.
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Different choices of |ψ〉, E0 and E1 give different protocols. [11] showed how
to achieve any combination of 0 < PA ≤ 1, 0 < PB ≤ 1 such that PAPB = 12 .
They also showed that this is the best possible for this protocol using two-
dimensional systems HA and HB and conjectured that this is the best for HA
and HB of arbitrary dimension. Thus, using qubits would be optimal for this
class of protocols, unlike in the known protocols for strong quantum coin flipping
[2, 10] where qutrits are needed to achieve the best results.
3 The lower bound
We now prove this conjecture.
Let PmaxA (E0, |ψ〉) and PmaxB (E0, |ψ〉) be the maximum probabilities of win-
ning for Alice and Bob, for the given choices of E0 and |ψ〉. We use the expres-
sions for PmaxA and P
max
B shown by [11]:
PmaxA = 2Tr(ρE
2
0), P
max
B = 2Tr(
√
ρE0ρ)
2,
where ρ is the density matrix of Bob’s part of |ψ〉. We will show that the
product of these expressions is at least 1
2
. The first step is to show that it is
enough to consider the case when the Schmidt decomposition of |ψ〉 consists of
eigenvectors of E0.
Lemma 1 For any choice of |ψ〉 and E0 in the protocol of [11], there exists |ψ˜〉
such that Bob’s part of Schmidt decomposition of |ψ˜〉 consists of eigenvectors of
E0 and P
max
A (E0, |ψ˜〉) ≤ PmaxA (E0, |ψ〉), PmaxB (E0, |ψ˜〉) ≤ PmaxB (E0, |ψ〉).
Proof: Let |φ1〉, . . ., |φk〉 be the eigenvectors of E0. Since E1 = I − E0, they
are also eigenvectors of E1. We write the state |ψ〉 sent by Alice in round 1 as
|ψ〉 =
k∑
i=1
λi|ϕi〉|φi〉.
Notice that this is not a Schmidt decomposition because |φi〉 are not necessarily
orthogonal. We consider a protocol in which Alice sends the state
|ψ˜〉 =
k∑
i=1
λi|i〉|φi〉
instead of |ψ〉. We claim that PmaxA and PmaxB in this protocol are less than
or equal to PmaxA and P
max
B when Alice sends |ψ〉. This is shown by mapping
Alice’s and Bob’s cheating strategies from the protocol with |ψ˜〉 to the protocol
with |ψ〉.
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Case 1: Alice. The most general strategy of Alice is to prepare a state
|ψ′〉 =
k∑
i=1
µi|ϕ′i〉|φi〉.
Bob’s measurement splits the state into two parts |ψ′
0
〉 and |ψ′
1
〉. Since |φi〉 are
eigenvectors of E0 and E1,
|ψ′1〉 =
k∑
i=1
µ′i|ϕ′i〉|φi〉.
After Alice sending her part to Bob, Bob tests the state |ψ′1〉 against the state
|ψ˜1〉 which would have resulted if Alice had prepared the honest state |ψ˜〉. Since
|ψ˜〉 is a superposition of |i〉|φi〉 and E0, E1 are diagonal in the basis consisting
of |φi〉, |ψ˜1〉 is a superposition of |i〉|φi〉 as well. Therefore, the inner product
between |ψ′
1
〉 and |ψ1〉 is maximized if |ϕ′i〉 = |i〉 for all i and, if Alice sends
|ψ′′〉 =
k∑
i=1
µi|i〉|φi〉
instead of |ψ′〉, this only increases her success probability. To finish the proof,
notice that sending the state
|ψ′′′〉 =
k∑
i=1
µi|ϕi〉|φi〉
in the protocol for |ψ〉 achieves the same probability as sending |ψ′′〉 in the
protocol for |ψ˜〉.
Case 2: Bob. An honest Bob’s measurement splits |ψ˜〉 into states |ψ˜0〉 and
|ψ˜1〉. Since E0 and E1 are diagonal in the basis |φi〉, the state |ψ˜0〉 is of the
form
|ψ˜0〉 =
∑
i
ai|i〉|φi〉.
A dishonest Bob’s most general strategy is to transform the state |ψ˜〉 into a
state having maximum overlap with |ψ˜0〉. Since he cannot access |i〉, the state
having maximum overlap is just |ψ˜〉. Therefore, Bob’s best strategy is just to
leave |ψ˜〉 unchanged, claim b = 0 and send his part of the state back to Alice.
The same success probability can be achieved by Bob in the protocol for |ψ〉 by
a similar strategy (claim b = 0 and send the state back). ✷
Similarly to [11], let ρ be the density matrix of Bob’s side of |ψ〉. We write
density matrices ρ and E0 in the basis consisting of |ψi〉. Both matrices are
4
diagonal in this basis. Let ai be the elements on the diagonal of ρ and bi be the
elements on the diagonal of E0. Then,
PmaxA = 2Tr(ρE
2
0) = 2
k∑
i=1
aib
2
i ,
PmaxB = 2Tr(
√
ρE0ρ)
2 = 2(
2∑
i=1
ai
√
bi)
2
and we have the extra constraint that Tr(ρE0) =
∑
i aibi =
1
2
(because the
outcome of an honest coin flip is 0 with probability 1/2).
By Holder’s inequality, we have ‖x‖3‖y‖ 3
2
≥ 〈x|y〉 and ‖x‖33‖y‖33
2
≥ 〈x|y〉3
for any vectors x, y. Applying this inequality to x = (a
1/3
i b
2/3
i )
k
i=1 and y =
(a
2/3
i b
1/3
i )
k
i=1 gives us
PmaxA P
max
B = 4
k∑
i=1
aib
2
i
(
k∑
i=1
ai
√
bi
)2
≥ 4
(
k∑
i=1
aibi
)3
= 4
(
1
2
)3
=
1
2
.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that any choice of parameters in the protocol of [11] gives
PmaxA P
max
B ≥ 12 . Curiously, this is the same as the lower bound of [6] for
arbitrary protocols for strong coin flipping. However, there does not seem to
be any direct connection between the two results. It remains open whether a
different protocol (not in the class described above) for weak coin flipping could
achieve a better security.
Another interesting question about coin flipping protocols is “cheat-sensitivity”
studied by [1, 5, 11]. A protocol for coin flipping or other cryptographic tasks
is cheat-sensitive if a dishonest party cannot increase the probability of one
outcome without being detected with some probability. Many quantum pro-
tocols display some cheat-sensitivity but it remains to be seen what degree of
cheat-sensitivity can be achieved.
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